CONIAH
in
every
case.
The
only
two
passages
which
seem
to
imply
that
the
'assembly'
was
a
limited
section
of
the
'congregation,'
viz.
Ex
12»,
Nu
14'
'all
the
assembly
of
the
congregation,'
etc.,
clearly
show
conflate
readings
(cf.
LXX.).
What
difference,
finally,
can
be
detected
between
'
the
assembly
o{
J"'
of
Nu
16^
20*
(cf.
Dt
23=-
<)
and
'the
congregation
of
J""
of
27"
31"
—
all
P
passages?
In
the
LXX
'Mhah
is
In
most
cases
rendered
by
aynagSgi,
qahai
by
ecclSsia,
both
being
used,
according
to
SchOrer,
without
essential
distinction
to
signify
the
religious
community
of
Israel,
in
this
agreeing,
as
has
been
argued
above,
with
the
original
and
with
our
AV.
The
subsequent
history
of
these
terms
in
the
Jewish
and
early
Christian
Churches
is
of
considerable
interest.
Later
Judaism,
as
SchUrer
has
shown,
began
to
dis-tinguish
between
synagBgS
and
ecdesia
in
the
direction
of
applying
the
former
in
an
empirical,
the
latter
in
an
ideal,
sense,
the
one
to
signify
the
religious
community
in
a
particular
place,
the
other
'the
community
of
those
called
by
God
to
salvation,'
the
ideal
Israel.
This
Jewish
usage
explains
how,
while
synagBgi
is
occasionally
found
in
early
Patristric
literature
in
the
sense
of
'
the
Christian
congregation,'
its
rival
finally
gained
the
day.
The
Christian
synagogue
became
'the
Church,'
while
the
Jewish
Church
remains
'the
synagogue'
(see
under
Church,
Synagogue).
The
expression
solemn
assembly,
in
which
'solemn'
has
its
etymological,
but
now
obsolete,
sense
of
'stated,'
'appointed'
(lit.
'yearly,'
soUennis),
represents
a
third
Heb.
word
applicable
originally
to
any
religious
gather-ing
(Am
S«,
Is
1",
2
K
102°),
but
afterwards
limited
to
those
appointed
for
the
seventh
day
of
the
Feast
of
Unleavened
Cakes
(.Mazzoth,
Dt
16'),
and
the
eighth
of
the
Feast
of
Booths
(Lv
23»,
Nu
2936).
'
Holy
convocation'
occurs
frequently
in
the
Priestly
sections
of
the
Pentateuch
(esp.
Lv.
17-26
[h]).
The
'mount
of
the
congregation,
in
the
uttermost
parts
of
the
north'
(Is
14"
RV),
to
which
the
king
of
Babylon
aspired,
was
the
Babylonian
Olympus
or
abode
of
the
gods.
An
echo
of
this
mythological
conception
is
probably
to
be
found
in
the
similar
phrase
Ps
48'.
For
tabernacle
of
the
congregation
see
Tabernaci,b.
A.
R.
S.
Kennedy.
CONIAH
(Jer
22m-
m)
=
jehoiachin
(wh.
see).
CONSCIENCE.—
The
term
occurs
30
times
in
the
NT;
it
signifies
joint
knowledge.
The
two
things
known
together
may
be
two
motives,
two
deeds,
etc.
;
or
the
comparison
instituted
may
be
between
a
standard
and
a
volition,
etc.
Self
or
others
may
be
judged,
and
ap-proval
(Ac
23'
24",
Ro
91,
2
Co
1",
1
Ti
l'-
"
3»,
2
Ti
1»,
He
1318,
1
p
318.
ji)
or
disapproval
(Jn
8»,
He
9'
102-
22)
may
be
the
issue.
The
conviction
that
a
certain
course
of
conduct
is
right
is
accompanied
by
a
sense
of
obligation,
whether
that
course
receives
(Ro
13=)
or
fails
to
secure
(1
P
2",
Ac
4i»-
2»)
legal
confirmation.
The
belief
on
which
the
consciousness
of
duty
depends
is
not
necessarily
wise
(1
Co
8'-
">■
'2,
Ac
26»),
though
the
holders
of
the
belief
should
receive
careful
consideration
on
the
part
of
more
enlightened
men
(Ro
15',
1
Co
8.
1025-29).
Unfaithfulness
to
moral
claims
leads
to
fearful
deterioration,
resulting
in
con-fusion
(Mt
622-
23)
and
insensitiveness
(1
Ti
42,
Tit
1").
1.
Sphere.
—
'The
sphere
of
conscience
is
volition
in
all
its
manifestations.
That
which
merely
happens
and
offers
to
us
no
alternative
movement
lies
outside
moraUty.
Let
there
be
a
possibility
of
choice,
and
conscience
appears.
Appetites,
so
far
as
they
can
be
controlled;
incentives
of
action
admitting
preference;
purposes
and
desires,
—
all
deeds
and
institutions
that
embody
and
give
effect
to
human
choice;
all
relation-ships
that
allow
variations
in
our
attitude
give
scope
for
ethical
investigation,
and
in
them
conscience
is
directly
or
indirectly
implicated.
Conscience
makes
a
valuation.
It
is
concerned
with
right,
wrong;
worthi-ness,
unworthiness;
good,
bad;
better,
worse.
This
CONSCIENCE
appraisement
is
ultimately
occupied
with
the
incentives
that
present
themselves
to
the
will,
in
regard
to
some
of
which
(envy
and
malice,
for
instance)
there
is
an
immediate
verdict
of
badness,
and
in
regard
to
others
a
verdict
of
better
or
worse.
The
dispositions
that
are
commended
by
the
Saviour's
conduct
and
teachings
—
purity
of
heart,
meekness,
mercifulness,
desire
for
righteousness,
etc.
—
are
recognized
as
worthy
of
honour.
The
conscience
censures
the
selfishness
of
the
Unjust
Judge
(Lk
18«),
and
assents
to
the
injunction
of
con-siderateness
and
justice
(Ph
2<).
The
rightness
of
many
general
statements
is
discerned
intuitively,
and
is
carried
over
to
the
deeds
that
agree
therewith.
Sidg-wick
considers
that
the
statement
'
I
ought
not
to
pre-fer
my
own
lesser
good
to
the
greater
good
of
another'
is
axiomatic,
and
that
some
such
intuitively
discerned
principle
is
a
necessary
foundation
of
morals.
We
do
not
question
the
baseness
of
some
pleasures;
their
curse
is
graven
on
their
foreheads.
Both
mediately
and
immediately
we
arrive
at
etUcal
convictions.
The
appearance
in
one's
life
of
a
person
of
distinguished
excellence
will
cause
many
virtues
to
stiine
in
our
estimation.
The
mind
surveying
a
course
of
conduct
can
judge
it
as
bad
or
good
on
the
whole.
A
precept
to
seek
to
raise
the
whole
tone
of
one's
life
(Mt
6",
Col
4'2)
is
felt
to
be
reasonable,
and
as
the
capacity
for
improve-ment
is
greater
in
man
than
in
any
other
creature,
better
motives,
deeds,
habits,
aims,
characters
may
righteously
be
demanded.
2.
Obligation.
—
'In
the
recognition
of
any
conduct
as
right
there
is
involved
an
authoritative
prescription
to
do
it.'
This
feeling
of
oughtness
—
which
is
the
core
of
conscience
—
can
be
exhibited
but
not
analyzed.
It
is
an
ultimate.
It
is
unique.
It
is
an
evidence
within
the
soul
that
we
are
under
government.
There
is
a
'cate-gorical
imperative'
to
aim
at
that
which
we
have
admitted
to
be
right.
From
the
duty
discerned
there
issues
a
command
which
cannot
be
silenced
so
long
as
the
duty
is
present
to
the
mind.
Likings
or
dislikings,
hopes
or
fears,
popularity
or
unpopularity
—
no
matter
what
may
be
advanced,
—
the
dictatorial
mandate
is
unaltered:
*
'Tis
man's
perdition
to
be
safe.
When
for
the
truth
he
ought
to
die.'
When
Jesus
Christ
asserts
His
supremacy
and
demands
deference
to
Himself
at
all
costs.
He
does
so
as
the
incarnation
of
the
moral
law.
To
be
His
friend
is
to
be
under
His
orders
(Jn
15"),
and
one
is
bound
to
follow
Him
without
regard
to
any
claims
that
can
be
urged
by
self
or
kindred
(Mt
lO^'-
ss,
Lk
143»).
Let
it
be
ascertained
that
this
is
the
way
and
the
command
is
at
once
heard,
'Walk
ye
in
it.'
The
peremptory
claim
made
by
conscience
is
eminently
reasonable,
because
it
rests
upon
what
we
have
admitted
to
be
right.
It
is
a
provision
in
our
nature
that
links
—
or
that
would
link
if
we
were
loyal
—
belief
and
practice,
and
would
cause
us
to
be
builders
as
well
as
architects.
'Had
it
strength
as
it
has
right
;
had
it
power
as
it
has
mani-fest
authority,
it
would
absolutely
govern
the
world'
(Butler,
Serm.
ii.).
3.
The
ethical
feeling.
—
The
perception
of
oughtness
has
its
own
emotional
tone.
There
is,
of
course,
a
sense
of
relief
when
the
mind
has
arrived
at
a
decision;
but
is
there
not
an
additional
element?
Is
there
not
an
inclination
—
at
least
a
taint
one
—
in
favour
of
the
behest?
And
in
men
habitually
conscientious,
is
not
the
inclina-tion
immediate
and
strong?
All
men
are
clearly
aware
that
they
are
wrong
in
case
of
refusal
to
obey.
,Man
is
a
born
judge
of
himself,
and
the
verdict
that
results
from
self-examination
brings
peace
or
uneasi-ness.
Herod
is
ill
at
ease
by
reason
of
self-judgment
(Mk
62"),
and
so
is
FeUx
(Ac
242s).
Peter
sees
himself
as
one
who
has
broken
the
law,
and
the
light
hurts
him
(Lk
6*).
All
the
best
men
have
had
some
experience
like
that
of
Isaiah
(6')
and
that
of
Job
(42"),
for
with
them
the
moral
susceptibility
has
been
great.
All
the
