JUSTICE
iniscence
of
the
matriarchate;
and
the
tact
that
the
head
of
the
family
exercises
his
power
recalls
the
earUer
rSgime
already
referred
to,
while
the
present
institution
of
the
administration
of
justice
by
elders
is
also
borne
witness
to.
See,
further,
Judges.
Another
point
of
importance
which
must
be
briefly
alluded
to
is
the
'judgment
of
God.'
In
the
case
of
questions
arising
in
which
the
difficulty
of
finding
a
solution
appeared
insuperable,
recourse
was
had
to
the
judgment
of
God
(see
Ex
228-
');
the
'judges'
referred
to
here
(RV
has
'God'
in
the
text,
but
'judges'
in
the
mg.)
were
those
who
were
qualified
to
seek
a
decision
from
God.
See,
in
this
connexion,
Dt
21'-».
(c)
In
the
monarchical
period
a
further
development
takes
place;
the
older
system,
whereby
justice
was
administered
by
the
elders
of
the
cities,
is
indeed
still
seen
to
be
in
vogue
(of.
1
K
2is-i3)
;
but
two
other
powers
had
now
arisen,
and
both
tended
to
diminish
the
power
and
moral
influence
of
the
elders
of
the
cities,
so
far
as
their
judicial
functions
were
concerned.
(i)
The
king.
—
It
is
probable
that
at
first
he
decided
appeals
only,
but
in
course
of
time
all
important
matters
—
so
far
as
this
was
possible
—
were
apparently
brought
before
him
(see
1
S
82°,
2
S
14'ffl-
IS"-',
1
K
3',
2
K
15=);
according
to
1
K
7',
Solomon
had
a
covered
place
constructed,
which
was
called
the
'
porch
of
judgment,'
and
which
was
in
close
proximity
to
his
own.
palace.
But
though
the
king
was
supreme
judge
in
the
land,
it
would
obviously
soon
have
become
impossible
for
him
to
attend
to
all
the
more
important
causes
even;
the
number
of
these,
as
well
as
other
calls
upon
his
time,
necessitated
the
appointment
of
representatives
who
should
administer
justice
in
the
king's
name.
The
appointment
of
these
must
have
further
curtailed
the
powers
of
the
earUer
representatives
of
justice,
already
referred
to.
One
of
the
worst
results,
however,
of
this
was
that
the
motives
of
administering
justice
became
different;
in
the
old
days,
when
the
sheik,
or
the
city
elder,
was
called
upon
to
decide
an
issue,
he
did
it
rather
in
the
capacity
of
a
friend
who
desired
peace
between
two
other
friends
than
as
a
strictly
legal
official;
his
interest
in
the
disputants,
as
being
both
of
his
own
kin,
or
at
all
events
both
members
of
the
same
community
to
which
he
belonged,
impelled
him
to
do
his
utmost
to
make
peace.
It
was
otherwise
when
a
stranger
had
to
decide
between
two
men
of
whom
he
knew
nothing;
he
had
no
personal
interest
in
them,
nor
would
it
have
been
his
main
endeavour
to
try
to
secure
a
lasting
peace
between
the
two,
as
had
been
the
case
in
earlier
days
among
the
sheiks
and
city
elders;
the
tie
of
kinship
was
absent.
The
result
was
that
personal
interest
of
another
kind
asserted
itself,
and,
as
there
is
abundant
evidence
to
show,
the
administration
of
justice
was
guided
rather
by
the
prospect
of
gain
than
in
the
interests
of
equity.
It
is
an
ever-recurring
burden
in
the
Prophetical
writings
that
justice
is
thwarted
through
bribery:
'
Every
one
loveth
gifts
and
followeth
after
rewards'
(Is
l^;
see,
further,
5'-
^o.
za,
Mic
3"
T,
Ezk
18'
22'2
etc.,
and
ct.
the
picture
of
the
ideal
judge
in
Is
112-
<).
A
very
aggravated
instance
of
the
mis-carriage
of
justice
is
recorded
in
1
K
21
;
but
such
cases
were
undoubtedly
rare
exceptions;
so
far
as
Israel
and
Judah
were
concerned,
it
was
not
from
the
central
authority
that
the
perversion
of
justice
proceeded,
but
rather
from
the
king's
representatives,
the
'princes'
(sarim),
who
misused
their
authority
for
nefarious
ends.
(ii)
The
priesthood.
—
Even
before
the
Exile
the
ad-ministration
of
justice
was
to
a
large
extent
centred
in
the
hands
of
the
Levitical
priesthood;
nothing
could
illustrate
this
more
pointedly
than
Dt
19"-2i,
where
the
outlines
of
a
regular,
formulated,
judicial
system
seem
to
be
referred
to,
in
which
the
final
authority
is
vested
in
the
priesthood.
What
must
have
contributed
to
this
more
than
anything
else
was
the
fact
that
from
early
times
such
matters
as
seemed
to
the
elders
of
the
city
to
defy
a
satisfactory
solution
were,
as
we
have
already
seen.
JUSTICE
submitted
to
the
judgment
of
God;
the
intermediaries
between
God
and
men
were
the
priests,
who
carried
the
matter
into
the
Divine
presence,
received
the
Divine
answer,
and
announced
that
answer
to
those
who
came
for
judgment
(see
Ex
228-
»,
and
esp.
Dt
SS*"-
'
And
of
Levi
he
said,
Thy
Thummim
and
thy
Urim
are
with
thy
godly
one.
.
.
.').
It
is
easy
to
see
how,
under
these
circumstances,
the
authority
of
the
priesthood,
in
all
matters,
tended
constantly
to
increase
(see,
further,
Dt
178-u
19«-!>).
But
in
spite
of
the
rise
of
these
two
new
factors
—
the
king
and
the
priesthood
—
^it
must
be
borne
in
mind
that
the
elders
of
the
cities
still
continued
to
carry
out
their
judicial
functions.
Regarding
what
would
correspond
to
the
modern
idea
of
a
law
court,
we
have
no
data
to
go
upon
so
far
as
the
eariiest
period
is
concerned
;
but
it
may
be
taken
for
granted
that,
among
the
nomads,
those
who
had
a
quarrel
would
repair
to
the
tent
of
the
sheik,
in
which
an
informal
court
would
be
held.
From
the
time
of
the
settlement
in
Canaan,
however,
and
onwards,
when
city
Ufe
had
developed,
there
is
plenty
of
Information
on
the
subject.
The
open
space
in
the
immediate
vicinity
of
the
city
gate
was
the
usual
place
for
assembUes
of
the
people,
and
it
was
here
that
the
more
formal
'courts
of
law'
were
held
(see
Am
5<'-
"s,
Dt
211'
22"
25',
Zee
8'=;
the
'porch
of
judgment'
of
king
Solomon
[1
K
7'],
already
referred
to,
was
of
course
exceptional).
2.
Post-exilic
period.
—
At
the
time
of
Ezra
we
find
that
the
administration
of
justice
by
the
elders
of
the
city,
which
had
continued
throughout
the
period
of
the
monarchy,
is
still
in
vogue
(see
Ezr
7^
10");
they
presided
over
the
local
courts
in
the
smaller
provincial
towns.
These
smaller
courts
consisted
of
seven
members;
in
the
larger
towns
the
corresponding
courts
consisted
of
twenty-three
members.
In
the
event
of
these
lower
courts
not
being
able
to
come
to
a
decision
regarding
any
matter
brought
before
them,
the
case
was
carried
to
the
superior
court
at
Jerusalem,
the
Sanhedrin
(wh.
see).
The
procedure
in
these
courts
was
of
the
simplest
character:
the
injured
person
brought
his
complaint
before
the
judges,
previous
notice
having
been
given,
and
publicly
gave
his
version
of
the
matter;
the
accused
then
in
his
turn
defended
himself;
—
judging
from
Job
Si's
a
written
statement
was
sometimes
read
out;
—
the
testimony
of
two
wit-nesses
at
least
was
required
to
substantiate
an
ac-cusation;
according
to
the
Talmud,
these
witnesses
had
to
be
males
and
of
age,
but
the
testimony
of
a
slave
was
not
regarded
as
valid.
Before
witnesses
gave
their
testimony
they
were
adjured
to
speak
the
truth,
and
the
whole
truth.
False
witnesses
—
and
these
were
evidently
not
unknown
—
had
to
suffer
the
same
punish-ment
as
the
victim
of
their
false
testimony
would
have
had
to
undergo,
or
had
undergone.
If
no
witnesses
were
forthcoming,
the
truth
of
a
matter
had,
so
far
as
possible,
to
be
obtained
by
the
cross-questioning
and
acumen
of
the
judges.
3.
In
the
NT.
—
The
administration
of
justice
under
the
Roman
rigime
comes
before
us
in
connexion
with
St.
Paul
(Ac
24
ff.).
According
to
Roman
law,
when
a
Roman
citizen
was
accused
of
anything,
the
magistrate
could
fix
any
time
that
suited
him
for
the
trial
;
however
long
the
trial
might
be
postponed,
the
accused
was
never-theless
imprisoned
for
the
whole
time.
But
there
were
different
kinds
of
imprisonment
recognized
by
Roman
law,
and
it
lay
within
the
magistrate's
power
to
decide
which
kind
the
prisoner
should
suffer.
These
different
grades
of
custody
were:
the
pubhc
gaol,
where
the
prisoner
was
bound
in
chains
(ct.
Ac
12°
21'');
in
the
custody
of
a
soldier,
who
was
responsible
for
the
prisoner,
and
to
whom
the
prisoner
was
chained
;
and
an
altogether
milder
form,
according
to
which
the
accused
was
in
custody
only
so
far
that
he
was
under
the
super-vision
of
a
magistrate,
who
stood
surety
for
him;
it
