dogmas
oonoeming
God
which
had
been
foiind
re-
pugnant
or
opaque
to
reason
were
philosophically
reinstated
and
became
once
more
authoritative
for
faith.
In
his
System
of
Synthetic
Philosophy
Herbert
Spencer
{First
Principles
^
London,
1860-62)
main-
tains
on
the
one
hand
an
ultimate
reality
which
is
the
postulate
of
theism,
the
absolute
datum
of
con-
sciousness,
and
on
the
other
hand
by
reason
of
the
limitations
of
knowledge
a
total
human
incapacity
to
assign
any
attributes
to
this
utterly
inscrutable
power.
In
accordance
with
his
doctrine
of
evolu-
tion
he
holds
that
this
ultimate
reality
is
an
in-
finite
and
eternal
energy
from
which
all
things
pro-
ceed,
the
same
which
weUs
up
in
the
hmnan
con-
sciousness.
He
is
neither
materialistic
nor
atheistic.
This
reality
is
not
personal
according
to
the
human
type,
but
may
be
super-personal.
Religion
is
the
feeling
of
awe
in
relation
to
this
inscrutable
and
mysterious
power.
With
an
aim
not
unlike
that
of
Herbert
Spencer,
Matthew
Arnold
sought
to
recon-
cile
the
conflicting
claims
of
religion,
agnosticism,
evolution,
and
history,
by
substituting
for
the
traditional
personal
God
the
"
Power
not
ourselves
that
makes
for
righteousness.''
Side
by
side
with
this
movement
appeared
another
led
by
Samuel
Taylor
Coleridge,
based
upon
a
spiritual
philosophy,
which
found
in
the
moral
nature
a
revelation
of
God
{Aids
to
Reflexion,
London,
1825).
This
has
borne
fruit
in
many
directions
:
in
the
great
poets,
Words-
worth,
Tennyson,
Browning;
in
preachers
like
Cardinal
Newman,
Dean
Stanley,
John
Tulloch,
Frederick
William
Robertson,
and
Charles
Kingsley;
in
philosophical
writers,
as
John
Frederic
Denison
Maurice
and
James
Martineau
(qq.v.).
The
idea
of
God
is
taken
out
of
dogma
and
the
category
of
the
schools
and
set
in
relation
to
life,
the
quickening
source
of
ideals
and
of
all
individual
and
social
advance.
Religious
thought
in
America
has
fully
shared
in
these
later
tendencies
in
Great
Britain,
as
may
be
seen
by
reference
to
John
Fiske,
Idea
of
God
(Boston,
1886),
unfolding
the
implications
of
Spencer's
thought,
and,
reflecting
the
spirit
of
Coleridge,
William
Ellery
Channing,
Works
(6
vols.,
Boston,
1848),
W.
G.
T.
Stead,
"Introductory
Essay
"
to
Coleridge's
Works
(New
York,
1884),
and
Horace
Bushnell,
Nature
and
the
Supernatural^
and
Sermons
(in
Centenary
edition
of
his
Works,
New
York,
1903).
An
idea
of
God
based
on
ideal-
ism,
represented
in
Great
Britain
by
John
Caird,
Philosophy
of
Religion
(London,
1881),
Edward
Caird,
The
Evolution
of
Religion
(ib.
1893),
in
(Canada
by
John
Watson,
God^s
Message
to
the
Human
Soul
(New
York,
1907),
has
received
im-
pressive
statement
by
Josiah
Royce,
The
Concep-
tion
of
God
(ib.,
1897),
and
The
World
and
the
Inn
dividual
(2
vols.,
1899-1901).
God
is
a
being
who
possesses
all
logical
possible
knowledge,
insight,
wisdom.
This
includes
omnipotence,
self-conscious-
ness,
self-possession,
goodness,
perfection,
peace.
Thus
this
being
possesses
absolute
thought
and
ab-
solute
experience,
both
completely
organized.
The
absolute
experience
is
related
to
human
experience
as
an
organic
whole
to
its
integral
fragments.
This
idea
of
God
which
centers
in
omniscience
does
not
intend
to
obscure
either
the
ethical
qualities
or
the
proper
peraooality
of
the
absolute.
Turning
from
the
historical
survey
to
specifie
aspects
of
the
idea
of
God
which
have
in
more
recent
times
engrossed
attention,
there
4«
Theistic
come
into
view
the
theistic
argmnents,
Af^guments.
the
immanence,
the
personality,
the
Fatherhood
of
God,
and
the
Trinity.
Those
writers
who
have
not
acknowledged
the
force
of
Kant's
well-known
criticism
of
the
theistic
argu-
ments
maintain
the
full
validity
of
these
proofs
(cf
.
R.
Flmt,
Theism,
new
ed.,
New
York,
1890;
J.
L.
Diman,
The
Theistic
Argument,
Boston,
1882).
Others,
as
John
Caird
(ut
sup.),
conceive
of
the
cos-
mological
and
teleological
arguments
as
stages
through
which
the
human
spirit
rises
to
the
knowl-
edge
of
God
which
attains
fulfilment
in
the
onto-
logical,
the
alone
sufficient
proof;
yet
Caird
accords
a
real
validity
to
the
teleological
argiunent
inter-
preted
from
the
point
of
view
of
evolution.
Still
others
would
restate
the
first
and
second
argiunents
so
that
the
cosmologies!
argument
would
run
as
follows:
The
world
of
experience
is
manifold
and
yet
unified
in
a
law
of
universal
and
concomitant
variation
among
phenomena
caused
by
some
one
being
in
them
which
is
their
true
self
and
of
which
they
are
in
some
sense
phases.
As
self-sufficient,
this
reality
is
absolute;
as
not
subject
to
restric-
tions
from
without,
it
is
infinite;
as
explanation
of
the
world,
it
is
the
world-ground.
The
teleological
argument
would
first
inquire
if
there
is
in
the
world
of
experience
activity
toward
ends,
and
secondly,
when
found,
refer
this
to
intelligence.
Other
forms
of
the
theistic
argument
are
drawn
from
the
fact
of
finite
intelligence,
from
epistemology
(in
reply
to
agnosticism),
from
metaphysical
considerations
in
which
purposeful
thought
is
shown
to
be
the
essential
nature
of
reality,
and
from
the
moral
order
which
involves
freedom
and
obligation
to
a
personal
source
and
ideal
(cf.
E.
Caird,
Critical
Philosophy
of
Kant,
2
vols.,
Glasgow,
1889;
T.
H.
Green,
Prolegomena
to
Ethics,
4th
ed.,
London,
1899).
The
idea
of
divine
immanence
is
variously
pre-
sented.
Its
true
meaning
is
that
God
is
the
inner
and
essential
reality
of
all
phenomena,
5.
Im-
but
this
is
susceptible
of
two
very
manence.
different
interpretations.
On
the
one
hand,
a
pantheistic
or
metaphysical
immanence,
in
which
the
One
is
identified
with
the
many.
This,
however,
destroys
the
relative
inde-
pendence
of
the
human
consciousness,
eliminates
the
ethical
value
of
conduct,
and
breaks
down
the
very
idea
of
God
(cf
.
for
criticism
of
metaphysical
immanence,
J.
Caird,
ut
sup.;
J.
Royce,
The
World
and
the
Individual,
vol.
ii.).
Other
notions
of
im-
manence
are:
First,
God
is
present
by
his
creative
omniscience,
so
that
the
creation
is
in
his
image,
and
with
a
degree
of
independence,
proceeds
of
itself
and
realizes
the
divine
ideals
(G.
H.
Howison,
in
Royce's
Conception
of
God,
New
York,
1897).
Secondly,
the
inunanence
of
God
is
made
picturesque
by
the
analogy
of
the
outside
physical
phenomena
of
the
brain
and
the
inner
psychical
phenomena
of
consciousness
in
which
the
true
self
appears.
In
like
manner
the
veil
of
nature
hides
a
person,
complete,
infinite,
self-existent
(J.
LeConte,
also
in
Royce,
ut
sup.).
Thirdly,
God
is
personally
present
as
energy
in
all
things
and
particularly
in
all
per-
